Fake it till you make it: where a big story becomes fraud, in data
"Fake it till you make it" is the advice to act more capable or confident than you feel until the real thing catches up. Dictionaries file it under psychology: pretending to be a certain way until you become that way.[1] Applied to confidence, it is how many founders grow into the job. Applied to facts that investors and buyers rely on, it is how stories turn into securities fraud. The line falls where a story presents as true today something the business cannot verify, to people who are handing over money because they believe it.
This essay brings together four bodies of evidence: the court and regulator record of Theranos, Nikola, FTX and WeWork; research on how much fraud goes undetected; twelve years of the US Securities and Exchange Commission's enforcement statistics; and our own study of ten years of Wikipedia attention to these companies and their founders. We close with a framework, the Claim Ladder, and a method any founder, marketer or buyer can use this week.
Idea in brief
The problem. Every growing company tells a story that runs ahead of its numbers. Most of that stretch is ambition. Some of it moves money on claims nobody can check, and that is where the legal and reputational risk sits.
Why it happens. Fraud is mostly invisible while it runs. Researchers estimate that in normal times only about one-third of corporate frauds are detected, and that about 10% of large publicly traded companies are committing securities fraud in an average year.[9] A story that is not checked can keep growing.
The gap (our data). In our study of eight Wikipedia articles, attention to the companies faded after exposure, but attention to the founders stayed or grew. Elizabeth Holmes's article drew 41 times its pre-exposure monthly average in March 2022, more than six years after the first investigation, and almost 11 million views that year.
The answer. Separate what is true today from what you are building toward, and say which is which. Then climb the Claim Ladder: move each claim from "we say so" toward "a stranger can test it."
Key findings
The essay in 3 minutes- Finding 1$100,000
The claims that moved money were specific and checkable.
Theranos told investors it would generate more than $100 million in revenue in 2014. According to the SEC, it generated a little more than $100,000 from operations that year, about one-thousandth of the claim.[2]
- Finding 21/3
Most fraud stays hidden.
Researchers estimate that only one-third of corporate frauds are detected in normal times, and that fraud destroys 1.6% of equity value a year, equal to $830 billion in 2021.[9]
- Finding 3$459,000
Fraud at the top costs more.
In the 2024 edition of the largest global study of occupational fraud, the median loss caused by owners and executives was $459,000, against $60,000 for employees.[10]
- Finding 4456
Fewer SEC cases, more of them aimed at people.
The SEC filed 456 enforcement actions in fiscal year 2025, down from a peak of 868 in fiscal 2016. Standalone actions fell from 548 to 303, and about two-thirds of fiscal 2025's involved charges against individuals.[13][15]
- Finding 52.2×
The fraud story outlives the company.
In our study, the FTX and Nikola articles fell to 0.7 and 0.3 times their pre-exposure level three years later. The founders' articles held at 1.3 and 1.0 times, and Elizabeth Holmes's at 2.2 times.[16]
- Finding 6$1.93bn
A big story without a fraud finding can still fall.
WeWork's prospectus promised "to elevate the world's consciousness" and showed a 2018 net loss of $1.93 billion on revenue of $1.82 billion. It was withdrawn about seven weeks later.[7][8]
Chapter 1 · 1 min
What "fake it till you make it" means, and where it breaks
The phrase is useful in one narrow sense: acting more confident than you feel, so you can learn on the job. Every new founder pitches before feeling ready. Faking facts is a different act: telling an investor that a product works, that revenue exists or that a partner signed when none of it is true. Those claims move money, and once money moves on a false statement of fact, the problem is legal, not mental.
The SEC said it plainly when it charged Theranos in 2018. Jina Choi, then director of its San Francisco office: "Innovators who seek to revolutionize and disrupt an industry must tell investors the truth about what their technology can do today, not just what they hope it might do someday."[2]
Terms used in this essay
| Term | Meaning |
|---|---|
| Faking facts | Presenting a goal, a capability, a customer or a number as true today when it is not. |
| Securities fraud | Deceiving investors in connection with buying or selling securities, including shares in private companies. The SEC said in 2018 that there is "no exemption" for a company that is "non-public, development-stage, or the subject of exuberant media attention."[2] |
| Standalone action | An SEC enforcement case brought on new facts, as opposed to follow-on cases against people already convicted or enjoined, and cases against companies that are late with required filings.[13] |
| Money ordered | Disgorgement, prejudgment interest and civil penalties the SEC obtained orders for in a fiscal year; orders, not money collected.[13] |
Tip: Go through your pitch deck and mark every sentence as "true today," "goal" or "assumption." If anything in the "goal" pile is written in the present tense, rewrite it.
If you would like an outside read on which claims in your own story hold up, the Brave New audit reads them the way a skeptical buyer would.
Chapter 2 · 2 min
The evidence, part 1: claim versus record
Regulators and courts set out, in writing, what each company said and what was true. We read the primary documents for four cases and put the claims beside the record.
Figure 1. What was claimed, and what the record shows
| Company | What was claimed | What the record shows |
|---|---|---|
| Theranos | More than $100 million in revenue in 2014 | A little more than $100,000 in revenue from operations in 2014 (SEC) |
| Theranos | Products deployed by the US Department of Defense on the battlefield and on medevac helicopters | Technology "never deployed" by the Department of Defense (SEC) |
| Nikola | April 2020: Nikola "built this thing to be a true vehicle" (the Badger pickup) | Badger prototypes not delivered until December 2020, nearly three months after the founder resigned (SEC complaint) |
| FTX | Customer funds were safe | Customer funds spent "on real estate, political contributions, and investments" (Second Circuit) |
| WeWork | "Our mission is to elevate the world's consciousness" | 2018 net loss of $1.93 billion on revenue of $1.82 billion (S-1) |
Claims and findings as stated by the SEC, the SEC's complaint, the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and The We Company's own prospectus. The SEC's Nikola complaint states allegations. WeWork was not found to have committed fraud. Sources: references 2, 4, 6 and 7.
Theranos: the story outran the machine
On 14 March 2018, the SEC charged Theranos, Elizabeth Holmes and former president Ramesh "Sunny" Balwani with raising more than $700 million through "an elaborate, years-long fraud." Holmes settled without admitting or denying the allegations and accepted a $500,000 penalty and a 10-year officer and director bar.[2]
The criminal case was narrower than many remember. On 3 January 2022, a jury convicted Holmes on four counts of defrauding investors, involving wire transfers totalling more than $140 million, and acquitted her on the patient-related counts. She was sentenced to 135 months in federal prison. Balwani, tried separately, received 155 months.[3]
The story was not the crime. Selling it as current fact, to people investing on it, was.
Nikola: the claims went out on social media
In July 2021, the SEC charged Nikola's founder Trevor Milton with fraud for "repeatedly disseminating false and misleading information," typically through social media, about the company's products and technology. The SEC's regional director put the lesson in one line: "Public company officials cannot say whatever they want on social media without regard for the federal securities laws."[5]
The complaint dates the turn precisely. On 10 September 2020, a research firm holding a short position published a report saying Milton had misrepresented the business, and Nikola's stock fell about 24%. Milton resigned ten days later.[6]
FTX: the story said customer money was safe
On 12 June 2026, the Second Circuit upheld Sam Bankman-Fried's conviction on seven counts of fraud and conspiracy, his 25-year sentence and a forfeiture of approximately $11 billion.[4] It called the evidence, "conservatively stated, robust," and wrote the sentence that best defines where a story becomes fraud:
"While he was publicly reassuring customers, investors, and regulators that FTX customer funds were safe, he was simultaneously using FTX as his own personal piggy bank, spending customer funds on real estate, political contributions, and investments."[4]
The collapse took nine days. On 2 November 2022, a version of Alameda's balance sheet was published by a cryptocurrency news site, triggering customer withdrawals. On 11 November, FTX filed for bankruptcy because it could not meet them.[4]
Chapter 3 · 1 min
The evidence, part 2: a big story with no fraud finding
Not every collapse is a crime. No court found WeWork's IPO to be a fraud. Its prospectus, filed on 14 August 2019, told the story first and the numbers second.[7]
Figure 2. WeWork: revenue grew, and losses grew with it
USD millions, 0 to 2,000
H1 2019 covers six months only.
Revenue and net loss of WeWork Companies Inc., from the summary consolidated financial data in The We Company's Form S-1. Source: The We Company, Form S-1, 14 August 2019.
Revenue roughly doubled every year, and so did the net loss. All of it was disclosed, public investors read it, and on 30 September 2019 the company filed to withdraw the registration.[8] A mission statement cannot carry a balance sheet. When the story and the numbers disagree in a document people can read, the numbers win, and the reputation risk is the size of the gap between them.
Chapter 4 · 1 min
The evidence, part 3: how much fraud goes unseen
The cases above were caught. Most are not. Dyck, Morse and Zingales estimate that only one-third of corporate frauds are detected in normal times, and that about 10% of large publicly traded firms commit securities fraud in an average year, with a 95% range of 7% to 14%.[9] They used Arthur Andersen's demise, which put its former clients under added scrutiny and exposed frauds already under way. They also estimate that fraud destroys 1.6% of equity value each year, equal to $830 billion in 2021.[9] For a buyer or an investor, the absence of a scandal is weak evidence that a story is true.
Figure 3. Fraud at the top costs more
By perpetrator
By scheme
Median loss per case (USD), 0 to 800,000
Median loss per case of occupational fraud, by perpetrator's position and by scheme type, from 1,921 cases in 138 countries and territories. Source: ACFE, Occupational Fraud 2024: A Report to the Nations, key findings.
In the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners' 2024 study of fraud against people's own organisations, owners and executives caused median losses more than seven times those of employees.[10] The 2026 edition, covering 2,402 cases in 143 countries, found a median loss of $104,000 per case, a typical fraud lasting 12 months before detection, and 43% of frauds detected through a tip, more than half of them from employees.[11]
The people who tell a company's story to the outside world are the people whose fraud costs most, and the most common way fraud is found is that someone close to the facts notices the mismatch and says so.
Limits of this evidence
- The Dyck, Morse and Zingales estimates rest on one natural experiment in large publicly traded companies and are a lower bound.
- The ACFE studies describe detected fraud only, and the 2024 and 2026 samples differ, so they are not a trend.
- Consumer fraud is a separate problem, but it shows the same pull of a good story. US consumers reported losing $15.9 billion to fraud in 2025, and investment scams accounted for more than $7.9 billion of it, about half the total.[12]
Chapter 5 · 4 min
Original research: what the record and the attention data show
We measured two things a founder can learn from directly: how the regulator's activity has moved, and what happens to public attention after a story is exposed. Both use free, public data. The full method is at the end of this essay.
Study A: twelve years of SEC enforcement results
Each year the SEC publishes its enforcement results for the fiscal year ending 30 September. We read every release from fiscal 2014 to 2025 and took the totals exactly as stated.
Figure 4. SEC enforcement actions by fiscal year
Number of actions, 0 to 900. Fiscal year ends 30 September
| Fiscal year | Total actions | Standalone actions |
|---|---|---|
| 2014 | 755 | 413 |
| 2015 | 807 | 507 |
| 2016 | 868 | 548 |
| 2017 | 754 | 446 |
| 2018 | 821 | 490 |
| 2019 | 862 | 526 |
| 2020 | 715 | 405 |
| 2021 | 697 | 434 |
| 2022 | 760 | 462 |
| 2023 | 784 | 501 |
| 2024 | 583 | 431 |
| 2025 | 456 | 303 |
Number of enforcement actions filed in each fiscal year. Standalone actions exclude follow-on proceedings and cases against companies that are late with required filings; for 2014 and 2015 the SEC called them "independent actions." Source: SEC annual enforcement results press releases, fiscal 2014 to 2025; Brave New Media compilation, 3 November 2026.
The count peaked at 868 in fiscal 2016 and stayed between 697 and 862 through fiscal 2023. Then it fell to 583 and 456, the lowest in the series and 47% below the peak. Standalone cases fell from 548 to 303, a drop of 45%.
In its fiscal 2025 release, the SEC said that about two-thirds of its standalone actions involved charges against one or more individuals, and that nearly nine in ten standalone actions filed under its current leadership did.[13] A falling case count is not permission. The cases that remain are more likely to be about the person telling the story.
Figure 5. Money the SEC obtained orders for, by fiscal year
USD billions, 0 to 20
2015 and 2020 are approximately; 2016 to 2019 are more than. 2025 comparable excludes deemed-satisfied amounts and Stanford judgments. About 56% of FY2024 came from one judgment (Terraform Labs).
| Fiscal year | Money ordered (USD billions) |
|---|---|
| 2014 | 4.16 |
| 2015 | 4.2 |
| 2016 | 4.0 |
| 2017 | 3.789 |
| 2018 | 3.945 |
| 2019 | 4.3 |
| 2020 | 4.68 |
| 2021 | 3.852 |
| 2022 | 6.439 |
| 2023 | 4.949 |
| 2024 | 8.2 |
| 2025 (headline) | 17.9 |
| 2025 (comparable basis) | 2.7 |
Disgorgement, prejudgment interest and civil penalties ordered, as stated by the SEC. Figures for 2015 and 2020 are "approximately"; 2016, 2017, 2018 and 2019 are "more than." The 2025 comparable figure excludes amounts deemed satisfied by other court orders and the judgments in the Stanford Ponzi scheme litigation. Source: SEC annual enforcement results press releases, fiscal 2014 to 2025; Brave New Media compilation.
The money needs care. For eight years, orders sat between about $3.8 billion and $4.7 billion. Then single cases began to dominate. The SEC said about 56% of the record $8.2 billion in fiscal 2024 came from one judgment, against Terraform Labs and its founder.[14] The fiscal 2025 headline of $17.9 billion includes amounts the SEC deemed satisfied by other courts' orders and its long-running Stanford litigation. On the basis the SEC itself offered as comparable, fiscal 2025 orders were $2.7 billion: $1.4 billion in disgorgement and interest and $1.3 billion in penalties.[13]
A few founder-led frauds can account for most of a year's money, and the headline number in any report depends on definitions, the same lesson this essay draws for founders' own numbers.
Study B: what happens to attention after exposure
We pulled monthly English Wikipedia pageviews from July 2015 to December 2025 for four companies and their founders, and compared the month each story broke with the months before it.
Figure 6. Attention in the month the story broke, as a multiple of the months before
Multiple of prior monthly average (x), 0 to 35. Lime = founder article, navy = company article
Pageviews by human users in the month of the event, divided by the average monthly pageviews in the up to twelve months before it (three months for Theranos, Elizabeth Holmes and Nikola, where the data or the article starts later). Source: Brave New Media analysis of the Wikimedia pageviews API, 3 November 2026.
The first spike tracked how sudden the end was: FTX failed nine days after its trouble became public, and attention jumped about thirty-fold. The later result matters more. Three years on, attention to FTX and Nikola had fallen to 0.7 and 0.3 times its earlier level, while their founders' articles held at 1.3 and 1.0 times. WeWork and Adam Neumann, with no fraud finding, held at 3.5 and 9.2 times.
Figure 7. Theranos and Elizabeth Holmes: yearly Wikipedia pageviews
Pageviews (millions), 0 to 12. 2022: verdict (Jan), TV series (Mar), sentencing (Nov)
| Year | Theranos | Elizabeth Holmes |
|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 794,767 | 1,130,738 |
| 2017 | 322,595 | 422,676 |
| 2018 | 1,086,286 | 1,982,832 |
| 2019 | 2,615,607 | 5,965,698 |
| 2020 | 1,230,474 | 2,915,122 |
| 2021 | 1,637,089 | 4,107,527 |
| 2022 | 3,669,584 | 10,972,649 |
| 2023 | 1,216,283 | 3,898,354 |
| 2024 | 877,220 | 2,481,490 |
| 2025 | 670,945 | 2,133,529 |
Pageviews by human users of the English Wikipedia articles, by calendar year. Source: Brave New Media analysis of the Wikimedia pageviews API, 3 November 2026.
Theranos is the clearest case of a story that outlived the company. The founder's article out-drew the company's every year. Attention peaked not when the fraud was first reported, but in 2022, the year of the verdict and the sentencing and of a dramatised television series that began on 3 March 2022.[3][17] In March 2022 alone, the Holmes article drew about 2.84 million views, 41 times its average in the months before the first investigation. Over the full period, the founder's article drew 36.5 million views against 14.4 million for the company.
This is the reputational arithmetic of faking facts. A company that fails is forgotten. A founder whose story is shown to be false becomes the story, for years, on the platforms buyers, journalists and AI tools read first. That is the difference between brand and reputation: you write the brand story, and other people write the verdict on it.
Chapter 6 · 1 min
A framework: the Claim Ladder
The evidence points to one discipline: know how far each claim can be checked, and say it at that strength. Each rung up the Claim Ladder makes a claim harder to fake and easier to trust.
| Rung | What it means | Example | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| 5. Testable | A buyer or investor can test it themselves | A trial run on the buyer's own parts or data | Theranos ran most patient tests on other makers' machines while claiming its own; a test by the buyer would have shown it.[2] |
| 4. Public record | It sits in a filing, audit or court record | Audited accounts, a filed prospectus | WeWork's losses were in its S-1, and investors read them.[7] |
| 3. Third-party confirmed | Someone you do not control confirms it | A customer reference the buyer picks | 43% of occupational frauds are found through tips, most from people close to the facts.[11] |
| 2. Documented | You hold a document that backs it up | A signed contract, a delivery record | The Nikola complaint compares public claims with delivery dates.[6] |
| 1. Stated | You say so | A line in a pitch deck | About two-thirds of corporate fraud goes undetected, so "nobody has objected" proves little.[9] |
A healthy story uses every rung, but it labels them. Goals live at rung 1, and that is fine if they are called goals. The danger is a rung 1 claim presented as if it sat at rung 4.
Chapter 7 · 1 min
How to tell a big story without faking it
Step 1: Split today from tomorrow
Write two lists. "True today" holds only facts you could prove to a stranger this week. "Where we are going" holds the vision. Both belong in your pitch, but nothing moves from the second list to the first until it has earned it.
A stretched claim gets stretched again in each new market, translation and local sales deck. When we build AI flows that take a company's story to more markets and more buyers, the "true today" list is the source the flow draws from. The flow can then scale the story without scaling the risk.
Step 2: Label projections as projections
Every forecast should say it is a forecast and show its main assumptions. A number stated without its "if" is a promise you may not keep. Theranos's 2014 revenue projection is the extreme case: a number stated as an expectation, about a thousand times larger than what arrived.[2]
Step 3: Give proof others can test
The strongest proof is something you do not control: a reference call, audited figures, an independent test. A demo you stage yourself is the weakest, because it can always be arranged to work.
Tip: Before a big pitch, ask someone outside your company to verify your top five claims using only public information and the documents you would share. Wherever they get stuck, investors will too.
Step 4: Say what you do not know, and give every claim an owner
Naming your risks builds more trust than hiding them. The Hive's entry on trust architecture shows how to arrange evidence so the hardest-to-fake proof carries the most weight. Then make one person responsible for backing each public claim with a document, and review the list every quarter.
Which to do first
| Action | Claim Ladder rung | Effort | Risk it removes | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mark every claim "true today," "goal" or "assumption" | 1 | Low | Goals presented as facts | This week |
| Attach a document to every "true today" claim | 2 | Low to medium | Claims nobody can back up | This month |
| Line up two customer references the buyer can choose from | 3 | Medium | Proof only you control | This quarter |
| Put key numbers into audited or filed form | 4 | High | Numbers defined to flatter | Before raising or listing |
| Offer a trial on the buyer's own case | 5 | Medium | Staged demos | For each major deal |
Chapter 8 · 1 min
How buyers and investors can spot a "fake it till you make it" story
If you are being pitched, separate confidence from facts. Most fraud is not detected, so do not assume someone else has checked.[9]
Questions to ask
- "Can I test it myself?" Ask to run the product on your own case, not watch a demo.
- "What is true today, and what is a projection?" A good founder answers this cleanly.
- "Can I speak to a customer you did not pick?" References chosen by the founder tell you less.
Watch for secrecy presented as a competitive advantage, metrics nobody else uses, pressure to decide quickly, and big claims made mainly on social media rather than in documents. The SEC's Nikola case was built on that channel.[5]
This case is made up, but it's typical. Say a founder is pitching software that "cuts logistics costs by 30%." A careful investor asks where the 30% comes from. The honest founder says: "One pilot customer, over four months. You can call them. We do not yet know if it holds at scale." The founder who is faking it says: "Our clients consistently see 30% or more," and the client list turns out to be that one pilot. Same number. Only one survives a phone call.
Trust is scarce, as the Edelman Trust Barometer has shown for years, so a business that makes verification easy stands out.
Chapter 9 · 1 min
What this means for leaders
We work across supply chain and manufacturing, where claims get tested fast: a buyer can visit the plant, call a reference and pull a delivery record. The stories to worry about are the ones where every question gets a better story instead of a document.
For a company that wants to grow its customer base or enter new markets, the evidence points one way. Expansion multiplies your story: more sales decks, more languages, more distributors, more AI tools summarising you for buyers who have never met you. A claim that sits at rung 1 in your home market becomes a liability in ten markets. A claim that sits at rung 4 or 5 becomes an asset, because every new buyer can check it.
Our attention data adds a second point: when a story is shown to be false, the cost lands on the people who told it and stays on the open web for years.
If you want an outside read on whether your story and your evidence match before you take them to new markets, start with the Brave New audit.
Chapter 10 · 1 min
Common mistakes honest founders make
Most founders never come close to fraud, but smaller mistakes erode trust:
- Present tense for future plans. "We serve the whole of Europe" when you have signed one client in Spain.
- Borrowed logos. Showing a company's logo because someone there once took a call.
- Vanity metrics. Sign-ups instead of paying customers, without saying which is which.
- Rounding up. Calling $80,000 "six figures" or 40 customers "dozens of enterprises."
- Never updating the story. A claim that was true last year and quietly is not anymore.
Chapter 11 · 1 min
Methodology
Case documents. Figure 1 and the case sections use only the primary documents in references 2 to 8. Every quotation is word for word.
Study A: SEC enforcement results. On 3 November 2026 we downloaded the SEC's annual enforcement results press release for each fiscal year from 2014 to 2025 (references 13 to 15) from sec.gov with the user agent "BraveNewResearch/1.0 (+https://brave-new.com; research)". All twelve returned the page. Fiscal 2014's standalone count and fiscal 2021's money ordered come from the following year's release. Where the SEC wrote "approximately" or "more than," we report the stated figure and flag it.
Study B: Wikipedia attention. On 3 November 2026 we pulled monthly pageviews by human users from the Wikimedia pageviews API for eight English Wikipedia articles, July 2015 to December 2025. For FTX we added the earlier title "FTX (company)," because the article's main title changed in late 2022. Event months were fixed in advance from dated sources: October 2015 (the Wall Street Journal investigation of Theranos[18]), September 2020 (the short-seller report on Nikola[6]), November 2022 (FTX's bankruptcy[4]) and September 2019 (WeWork's withdrawal of its IPO filing[8]). The baseline is the average of the up to twelve months before the event month. "Three years later" is the average of months 25 to 36 after the event. Television premiere dates come from Wikidata.
Limits. Pageviews measure attention, not opinion, on English Wikipedia only. Some baselines cover three months, because the API starts in July 2015 and the Nikola article in June 2020. SEC definitions changed over time, and we report them as stated. Our case set is small and chosen because it is well documented, so it is not a sample of all frauds. The scripts, raw data and a CSV for every figure are published with this essay.
Chapter 12 · 1 min
Frequently asked questions
Is "fake it till you make it" good advice for entrepreneurs?
It is good advice for confidence and bad advice for facts. Acting more confident than you feel while you learn a role is normal. Presenting goals, revenue or product capabilities as real when they are not is different, and once others rely on those claims to invest or buy, it can become fraud.
Where is the line between storytelling and fraud?
The line falls where your story presents something as true today that you cannot verify, to people making financial decisions because of it. A vision is fine when it is labelled as a goal. The SEC's warning after Theranos was to tell investors what the technology can do today, not just what you hope it might do someday.
How common is corporate fraud?
More common than the headlines suggest. A 2024 study in the Review of Accounting Studies estimates that about 10% of large publicly traded companies commit securities fraud in an average year, and that only about one-third of corporate frauds are detected in normal times. It puts the cost at 1.6% of equity value a year, equal to $830 billion in 2021.
How can investors spot a startup that is faking it?
Ask for proof you can test yourself, not demos the founder controls. Speak to customers the founder did not choose. Ask what is true today and what is a projection, and what would make the business fail. Watch for secrecy presented as strategy, invented metrics, pressure to decide fast and claims made mainly on social media.
Can a marketing agency help a company tell a big story honestly?
Yes. An agency can sort every claim by how well it can be checked, rewrite goals so they read as goals, and build proof buyers can test. Brave New Media is a marketing agency that does this, with experience in supply chain and manufacturing, and builds AI flows that carry verified claims into new markets.
Your next step
This week, print your pitch deck or your homepage and mark every claim as "true today," "goal" or "assumption." Rewrite anything in the wrong tense, and attach a document to every "true today." Then place each claim on the Claim Ladder and pick the two most important ones to move up a rung this quarter.
If you want a team to run that review across every market you sell to, and an AI flow that carries only the claims that hold, start with the Brave New audit.
Brave New Media is a marketing agency that builds AI flows to help companies scale their ideas, grow their customer base and expand into new markets, with experience across supply chain and manufacturing.
See also
- Trust architecture, Brave New Hive
- Reputation risk, Brave New Hive
- Brand versus reputation, Brave New Hive
- The Edelman Trust Barometer, Brave New Hive
- The Brave New Business Journal, weekly thinking on business, money and AI
- Brave New Q&A, answers to common questions about how we work
References
1. Wiktionary. "Fake it till one makes it." en.wiktionary.org
2. US Securities and Exchange Commission. "Theranos, CEO Holmes, and Former President Balwani Charged With Massive Fraud." Press release 2018-41, 14 March 2018. sec.gov
3. US Attorney's Office, Northern District of California. "U.S. v. Elizabeth Holmes, et al." justice.gov
4. US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. United States v. Bankman-Fried, No. 24-961-cr, decided 12 June 2026. ww3.ca2.uscourts.gov
5. US Securities and Exchange Commission. "SEC Charges Founder of Nikola Corp. With Fraud." Press release 2021-141, 29 July 2021. sec.gov
6. US Securities and Exchange Commission. Complaint, SEC v. Trevor R. Milton, 1:21-cv-06445 (S.D.N.Y.), filed 29 July 2021. sec.gov
7. The We Company. Form S-1 Registration Statement, 14 August 2019. sec.gov
8. The We Company. Registration Withdrawal Request (Form RW), 30 September 2019, SEC EDGAR filing index. sec.gov
9. Dyck, A., Morse, A. and Zingales, L. "How pervasive is corporate fraud?" Review of Accounting Studies 29(1), 736-769, 2024. ideas.repec.org
10. Association of Certified Fraud Examiners. Occupational Fraud 2024: A Report to the Nations, key findings. acfe.com
11. Association of Certified Fraud Examiners. "Report: 84% of fraudsters show at least one behavioral red flag." Press release on Occupational Fraud 2026, 12 May 2026. acfe.com
12. Federal Trade Commission. Prepared statement on "The Rising Scam Economy" before the Joint Economic Committee, 25 March 2026. ftc.gov
13. US Securities and Exchange Commission. Enforcement results for fiscal year 2025. Press release 2026-34, 7 April 2026. sec.gov
14. US Securities and Exchange Commission. "SEC Announces Enforcement Results for Fiscal Year 2024." Press release 2024-186, 22 November 2024. sec.gov
15. US Securities and Exchange Commission. Annual enforcement results press releases for fiscal years 2014 to 2023: 2014-230, 2015-245, 2016-212, 2017-210, 2018-250, 2019-233, 2020-274, 2021-238, 2022-206 and 2023-234. sec.gov
16. Wikimedia Foundation. Pageviews API, per-article monthly views, English Wikipedia. wikimedia.org
17. Wikidata. "The Dropout" (Q65056901), start time 3 March 2022. wikidata.org
18. Buhr, S. "Theranos Refutes Claims Its Blood-Test Tech Is Unreliable." TechCrunch, 15 October 2015. techcrunch.com
19. Brave New Media. SEC enforcement series and Wikipedia attention study, 3 November 2026. Data published with this essay.